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Introduction 
Without doubt, Europe has emerged as one of the top destinations for Chinese 
investment. According to Rhodium Group's statistics, annual foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows in the 28 EU economies has grown from EUR 700 million 
in 2008 to EUR 30 billion in 2017.26 That represents a quarter of total Chinese 
FDI outflows last year. However, the Chinese approach towards Europe is far 
from being unified since China follows different motives and uses different 
approaches when dealing with different countries or regions of Europe: the 
access to successful brands, high-technology and know-how motivates China 
when entering Western European markets, investments in the green energy 
industry and sustainability brings Chinese companies to Nordic countries, while 
greenfield investments (manufacturing) and recently also infrastructural 
projects pulls them to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including also the 
non-EU member Western Balkan countries.  
It is difficult to determine whether it was a deliberate Chinese strategy or the 
lack of European cohesion that has encouraged China to deal bilaterally with 
individual member states (or groups of member states) but it certainly helped to 
achieve better results for China than engagement on the EU level. This is not a 
new phenomenon but characterizes China-EU relations from the early 
beginnings. This at least partly explains, why China decided to create platforms 
such as the 16+1 initiative or the China-Nordic framework: to enhance 
cooperation in different - economic as well as political - fields and to avoid, or at 
least delay and hinder, criticism at the EU level. European responses to these 
approaches also vary considerably in different regions of the continent: some 
countries have reservations about a growing Chinese presence while others 
welcome the resulting economic opportunities. Central and Eastern Europe - 
although opinions may differ from country to country - belongs to the latter 
group. 
Chinese companies on CEE markets 
Chinese companies have increasingly been targeting CEE countries in the past 
one and a half decades, while diplomatic relations are also on the rise. This 
development is quite a new phenomenon but not an unexpected one. On one 
hand, the transformation of the global economy and the restructuring of China’s 
economy are responsible for growing Chinese interest in the developed world, 
including the European Union. On the other hand, CEE countries have also 
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become more open to Chinese business opportunities, especially after the global 
economic and financial crisis with the intention of decreasing their economic 
dependency on Western (European) markets. Here, China can benefit a lot from 
the EU’s division between its core and periphery. For China, the region 
represents dynamic, largely developed, less saturated markets, new frontiers for 
export expansion, new entry points to Europe and cheap but qualified labour. 
This adds up to lower political expectations, fewer economic complaints, fewer 
protectionist barriers and fewer national security concerns in the CEE region 
compared to the Western European neighbours. The CEE countries' 
disappointment coming from the slower-than-expected catching-up processes to 
Western Europe also resulted in these countries turning towards the East. 
Recently, Western diplomats, scholars as well as media have raised attention to 
the growing Chinese influence in the CEE region and the potential implications 
for the EU or even globally. This mostly concerns China using economic relations 
(mainly investments) and other financial tools with certain European countries 
to gain political influence in Europe. Undoubtedly, there are certain signs for 
this: Hungary and Greece prevented the EU from backing a court ruling against 
China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, while Hungary’s 
ambassador to the EU was the only one not signing a report criticising the 
Chinese Belt and Road Initiative for benefitting Chinese companies and Chinese 
interests.27  
But are Chinese investments really responsible for China's growing influence in 
the CEE region as Western critics claim? The answer leaves room for doubts, at 
least.  
When compared to China’s economic presence globally or in the developed world, 
China’s economic impact on the CEE countries is relatively small: They are 
highly dependent on both trade and investment relations with developed 
countries, mainly-EU member states, while China represents a minor (although 
increasing) share. From a Chinese point of view, as far as trade or investment 
statistics are concerned, the CEE region is also far from being among the most 
important partner of China. Since the main motivation of Chinese investment in 
the developed world is to access important technologies, successful brands and 
new distribution channels, Germany, the UK and France accounted for more 
than half of the total Chinese investment value last year within the EU, while 
the combined CEE region received less than five percent.28  
Hungary, for example, is among the most popular destinations for Chinese FDI 
within the CEE region: while Chinese (MOFCOM) statistics show a rather 
modest stock of Chinese investment in Hungary (314 million USD), the 
Hungarian National Bank (HNB) - where statistics are broken down according to 
ultimate investors - displays 1782 million USD. Nevertheless, the dominance of 
EU partners has to be highlighted here, too: based on OECD and HNB statistics, 
more than 75 per cent of foreign investments are coming from EU countries, 
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more than 25 per cent from Germany, while only 2.4 per cent from China. This 
2.4 per cent share is, despite being the highest in Central and Eastern Europe by 
comparison, far from being decisive. It is also true, however, that although 
Chinese multinational companies represent a relatively small share, they have 
saved and/or created jobs (especially Wanhua and Huawei) and contributed to 
the economic growth of Hungary with their investments and exports. 
Furthermore, many of them (e.g. Lenovo, ZTE, Huawei, Bank of China) have 
turned their Hungarian businesses into European regional hubs for their 
activities.29  
CEE within Belt and Road 
Besides creating potential hubs/bridges/bridgeheads/gates for Chinese products - 
as many CEE leaders portrayed their own countries when talking about the 
potentials of strengthening ties with China - in the European Union, Chinese 
companies expressed their interest in several infrastructure-related investments 
in recent years, planned under a new framework, China’s Belt and Road 
initiative. China’s motivations are easy to understand, as the New Silk Road 
project expands China's political and economic sphere of interest: once the 
alternative transport routes are completed China will be in a more favourable 
strategic position, will have more and more alternative transport routes, can 
reach its target markets more easily and quickly and will be able to reduce some 
of the industrial overcapacities accumulated in recent years. In addition, these 
projects may provide a reference for further Chinese investment in the broader 
region, especially in the more developed part of Europe. 30 
Hungary was the first European country to sign a memorandum of 
understanding with China on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
Maritime Silk Road, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to 
Budapest in June, 2015. The Hungarian government was very keen on the 
Budapest-Belgrade railway project and when it signed the construction 
agreement in 2014, Prime Minister Orbán called it the most important moment 
in cooperation between the European Union and China.31 Infrastructure 
development is indeed a hot topic in all CEE countries; however, there are other 
resources – for example EU funds – to finance them. Therefore, a more 
interesting - and for the time being unanswered - question is: what motivates the 
Hungarian side in building infrastructure with Chinese companies, using 
Chinese credit to finance it? Here, the political factor seems to be more important 
than any economic rationale. 
The 16+1 Initiative 
a unified Europe for several reasons, ranging from economic issues (such as 
export and import relations, market size, investment opportunities, high 
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technology, etc.) and cooperation in climate change to international recognition 
or counterbalancing the US. Although we can never be sure about China's real 
intentions, it is possible that they are simply still learning how to deal with 
Europe. For example, when China decided to strengthen its relationship with the 
CEE region - by creating the 16+1 initiative - the original idea was that this 
process will bring China even closer to Europe. Subsequently, Beijing was rather 
surprised by Western fears that China tries to divide Europe and frustrate some 
aspects of the EU’s common China policy through this initiative. This may 
explain that recently the Chinese Government offered Germany to be included in 
the 16+1 talks as an observer. Similarly, China started to think about having 
16+1 summits every two years instead of annually. Further evidence is China's 
first infrastructure-building attempt in CEE: they tried to bring in the same 
package as in the developing world - Southeast Asia or Africa - not considering 
the different and sometimes very strict rules and regulations or standards of the 
EU. As a result, while Chinese foreign direct investment targets the EU member 
CEE countries, infrastructure projects are more prevalent in the non-EU CEE 
countries, where strict EU regulations do not apply.  
Conclusions 
From the CEE point of view, China can, of course, be able provide economic 
opportunities that would help to decrease the overly significant economic 
dependency on Western Europe. But - at least for now - this is not the case: as 
mentioned above, although Chinese trade volumes and investment stocks are on 
the rise in some of the CEE countries, this is far from being decisive or 
comparable to economic relations with EU countries. Referring to the title of this 
short overview, the 'piper' is still payed by the (Western) Europeans. Accordingly, 
in economic terms, CEE’s genuine interest would be to not to risk its relationship 
with the EU. The fact that some CEE countries are 'calling new tunes', i.e. they 
act or vote in favour of China and fuelling conflicts with the EU implies that 
their further engagement with China might come from political considerations.  
  
